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ABSTRACT 
 
Democracy, Dictatorship and the Cultural Transmission of 
Political Values* 
 
We develop a theory of endogenous regimes transitions (with a focus on democratic 
consolidation), which emphasizes the role of political culture and of its interaction with 
political institutions. Political culture reflects the extent of individual commitment across 
citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state 
variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of 
political socialization: the family and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit 
their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their children. The state invests 
resources in public indoctrination infrastructures. The model displays two-way 
complementarities between political regimes and political culture diffusion. Consolidated 
democracy emerges when sufficiently many people are committed to democracy. Otherwise 
the model features persistent fluctuations in and out of democracy as well as cycles of 
political culture. Importantly, the politico-economic equilibrium may exhibit a persistent 
(although declining) incongruence between political institutions and political culture, which 
tends to evolve more slowly than formal institutions. 
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In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West
there was a proper relation between the state and civil society, and when the state tremble
a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. (Antonio Gramsci, Selection from
Prison Notebooks).
1 Introduction
There is now a relatively large literature in economics and political science focusing on the
political economy of regime transitions (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, and
the references cited therein). A central question of this line of research concerns the conditions
under which a given society moves from some form of nondemocratic government (such as
civilian oligarchy, kleptocracy, or military dictatorship) to democracy, and vice versa. Two
features characterize this perspective. The rst one is the focus on economic and institutional
factors (income, wealth inequality, and conicts of interest between socioeconomic groups) in
a context where the government in power has limited capacity for policy commitments. The
second aspect is the adoption of a consequentialist perspective according to which agents have
only induced preferences over political institutions, namely they rank institutions according to
the policy outcomes such institutions generate.
In contrast to the consequentialist approach to political institutions, there is also a well
established literature in political science and political theory that emphasizes the role of political
culture and ideologies in explaining the dynamics of political institutions, and in particular, the
emergence and consolidation of democratic institutions. Along this tradition, political culture
is dened as [...] the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among
the members of a political system. It is the subjective realm that underlies and gives meaning
to political actions.(Almond and Verba, 1963). Similarly Easton (1965) highlights political
culture as a state of mind featuring a deep-seated set of attitudes which include the attachment
to democracy as the optimal political institution, the belief in its legitimacy and attachment
to its symbols. Building on this perspective, an extensive literature in political sociology and
comparative politics emphasizes the importance of immaterialfactors (values, ideologies and
legitimacy) as crucial determinants of the sustainability of specic political institutions. It also
points out the role of socialization agencieslike the state and the family in the transmission
of these factors across generations.
In this paper, we attempt to bridge the gap between these two perspectives of political
institutional dynamics. To do this, we develop a theory of political transitions which includes
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three main components. First, building on the consequentialist political economy tradition, we
assume that individuals tend to evaluate institutional systems according to their induced costs
and benets. Second, we include political culture as an important factor playing a role for a
variety of political, economic and institutional outcomes. Specically, we emphasize political
culture as a commitment device endowing citizens with a credible capacity to overcome collec-
tive action problems to defend or promote democracy in the event of a military coup.1 Finally,
we assume that political culture is acquired and transmitted by active political socialization
over time and across generations. In this setting, we investigate how cultural and institutional
factors interact and shape the endogenous dynamics of political regimes and policy outcomes
in a society.
Our work has two main related motivations. The rst one originates from several episodes
of democratic transitions suggesting an important underlying role of political culture in the
consolidation or not of a political regime. For instance, the process of democratic consolidation
following the breakdown of Communism proceeded at a very di¤erent pace in various Euro-
pean countries. It was indeed rather rapid in countries characterized by relatively strong civil
societies such as Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In such countries, broad based
and di¤used pro-civic and pro-democratic beliefs had developed before the communist regime
thanks to the existence of civic associations, trade-unions, the Church and family transmission
across generations. Conversely, democratic consolidation seemed to be much slower in coun-
tries like Croatia, Albania, Belarus and Ukraine, endowned with weaker and less developed
civil societies.2
The recent case of the Arab Spring, i.e. the sequence of rebellions occurred in 2011
in several Middle Eastern countries against incumbent authoritarian governments, is another
example suggesting how cultural factors may interact with institutional changes and evolu-
tions of specic political regimes (see for example Bradley, 2012, and Noueihed and Warren,
2012). Indeed, the institutional transformations that occurred in countries such as Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt, appear to have caused the replacement of relatively secular autocracies
with democraticregimes which have greatly empowered Islamist parties (partially repressed
under the previous incumbent regimes). Such parties have often endorsed extremist ideologies
1Bisin and Verdier (2000a and 2000b), among others, investigate the related issue of the role of ideology
as a coordination device for social groups or classes, for given political institutions. In this paper, we do not
address the related interesting problem of the role of political culture as a potential coordination device in order
to focus on its role as commitment device, in presence of endogenous political institutions.
2See for instance on this point Bunce (1999), Kubik (2000), Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel
(2009).
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and systems of values, rooted in some interpretation of the Islamic religion and very di¤er-
ent from those underlying the political culture of secular democracies.3 In countries where
signicant segments of the population share beliefs-systems largely incongruent with liberal
secular institutions, one may wonder about the possibility of the Arab Springto lead to the
emergence (and eventual stabilization) of some type of Islamic Republicrather than a form
of Western-type democracy.
A second motivation for this paper comes from the large political sociology tradition that
emphasizes the role of the state and the family as joint and interacting agents of political
socialization.4 For instance, Galston (2001) and Sapiro (2004) noticed the importance of
schools and the media for political socialization, elements which are potentially controlled by
the state. In the same vein, Skocpol (1996) observed how a variety of state organizations give
legitimation to the status quo political order. Various case studies as well highlighted the role
of the state in molding a democratic society and its political culture (see for example Baker,
Dalton and Hildebrandt, 1981, for the Federal Republic of Germany, Okamura, 1968, for post-
war Japan, or Bennich-Björkman, 2007a, b, c, on early democratic socialization in Estonia).5
Conversely, other pieces of work in comparative history have demonstrated how totalitarian
and authoritarian states made large ideological investments to indoctrinate their citizens and
persuade them of the legitimacy of their rule (see for instance Koon, 1985, for North Korea,
Keenan, 1986, for the Soviet Union, Obeidi, 2001, for Al-Quadhas Lybia, and De Grazia,
2002, for fascist Italy).
Parallel to the importance of the state, this perspective points out as well the role of the
family as a socialization agency of young peoples political attitudes and behaviors. Speci-
cally it provides detailed information on how parents act as role models and facilitators for the
acquisition of political values in the family, by providing information, talking about political
issues, engaging in political actions and providing children with a stable home environment.6
Overall, this line of thought highlights the importance of political socialization in the construc-
tion and consolidation of political systems, and suggests that it may be worthwhile integrating
3An exception to this might be the case of the Islamic Moderate Party or PJD, which has won the 2011
elections held in Morocco.
4Our paper thus emphasizes the political, rather than the economic role of the family, which is discussed for
instance in Alesina and Giuliano (2010).
5We will discuss later in more detail some cases, including Estonia, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
Japan, which illustrate how the implementation of democratic institutions can have a signicant and persistent
impact on the political culture of the new generations.
6See for instance Hyman (1959), Davies (1965), Langton (1969), Dawson and Prewitt (1969), Bronfenbrenner
(1979), Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009), Sapiro (2004), Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008).
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these dimensions to get a better understanding of the political economy of regime changes.
In this paper, we provide a model of political transitions using a framework with non-
overlapping generations living for two periods, which incorporates some relatively standard
ingredients of the existing related literature. In particular, there can be two political regimes,
democracy or military dictatorship, and formal political institutions correspond, as usual, to
a state variable of the model. In the former case the (producer) median voter decides the
scal policy, while this is set by the military (which is a self-interested agent potentially posing
a coup-threat to an incumbent democratic regime) in the latter case. The agents di¤ers for
their occupation, producers or soldiers, and for their attitude towards democracy. In order to
focus the attention on the role of political culture and to simplify the analysis, we abstract
from the role of income inequality and the inter-class distributive conict as determinants of
institutional change.7
The non-standard features of the model include the presence of two novel variables. The
rst one is an (additional) endogenous state variable reecting the fraction of citizens who are
either potentially intrinsically motivated to defend democracy (the committed citizens) or
not (the uncommitted citizens). In the sequel we will refer to this variable as the level of
political culture of the society at a point in time. This variable evolves according to a process
of cultural transmission across generations as in Bisin and Verdier (2001) in which preferences
for intrinsic motivation for democracy are transmitted through political socialization by pa-
ternalistic parents (each type making an individual investment in order to transmit their own
preferences to their children).
The second variable is a control variable reecting the ideological investment in democratic
indoctrination by the state or, for short, the public democratic investment or democratic stock.
Such a variable increases the value of political participation for those individuals that already
have intrinsic preferences for democracy. Under democratic institutions, this indoctrination
investment decision is taken by majority voting, and its outcome straightforwardly depends on
which group is larger in society, committed citizens being always in favor of greater investment
in civil virtues than uncommitted ones.
Uncommitted people never put individual e¤ort to defend democracy from a military coup,
whereas committed people put some e¤ort provided that the level of democratic indoctrination
is above a certain threshold value. The probability of success of coup depends negatively on
7This factor has been emphasized for endogenous political transitions by Boix (2003), Aghion, Alesina and
Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010, 2011) and Ticchi and
Vindigni (2010).
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the number of committed citizens who are willing to put e¤ort in defense of democracy, and it
determines the decision of the army to attempt to capture power in the rst place. Similarly,
under an incumbent non democratic (military) government, the probability of success of a
rebellion depends positively on the number of committed agents and the (endogenous) level of
repression that such government can impose. Yet, the decision to support democracy (or to
rebel against a military regime) is taken individually by each committed citizen, who obtains
some utility (depending on the public democratic investment) and/or the cost (depending on
military repression) from the act itself of a pro-democratic behavior. Anticipating the reaction
of the citizens, in equilibrium, the army attempts to make a coup only when the opposition to
it is expected to be relatively mild (i.e., there are relatively few committed citizens).
In this setting, a rst contribution of the paper is to highlight how family political socializa-
tion interact with existing formal political institutions and state indoctrination. Our analysis
emphasizes a degree of complementarity between family socialization and the structure of po-
litical institutions. The more prevalent a political culture favoring one type of political regime,
the more likely the emergence and consolidation of that particular political system. Conversely,
a given institutional system is more likely to promote the transmission of cultural values func-
tional to that system. These two-way interactions between cultural and institutional factors
then shape the endogenous dynamics of political regimes and policy outcomes in interesting
ways.
Specically, we show that when the share of committed citizens is higher than a certain
endogenous threshold, democracy is fully consolidated and military coups never occur along the
equilibrium path. Conversely, when democratic political values are not su¢ ciently di¤used, the
model features potentially persistent transitions between democracy and military dictatorships
along equilibrium paths emerging with positive probability. Along such paths, democracy is
more stable (i.e., it persists over time with greater probability) when the committed, rather the
uncommitted, citizens represent the majority, as the former have a greater incentive to make
public investments in democratic socialization. The reason for this comes from the fact that
committed citizens have both an intrinsic and a functional preference for democracy, whereas
uncommitted citizens have only standard functional preferences over political institutions,
whereby democracy only matters because of the more favorable policy outcomes that this
regime generates compared to the military regime.
A second contribution of our framework is to show that political culture is a persistent
phenomenon over time and across political regimes. In particular, it can be maintained even
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in the presence of incongruentformal political institutions. This is consistent with the idea
that culture appears to be like a slowmoving variable relatively di¢ cult to reshape (see
Eckstein, 1988, and especially Roland, 2004). Specically, the model generates at equilibrium
a potentially persistent (but declining over time) incongruence between formal political insti-
tutions and political culture.8 It is possible for the number of citizens committed to democracy
to remain relatively high for a long period of time, even under non democratic institutions,
because of the private transmission of democratic culture by the family (i.e., the number of
citizens intrinsically committed to democratic values). This phenomenon highlights therefore
the contrast between political culture and formal political institutions.
Empirically, this result is also important for two related reasons. First, it can help explain
why democracy may endogenously emerge or not in countries with di¤erent latent democratic
cultures, but otherwise similar in terms of observable fundamentals, such as the level of eco-
nomic development, the nature of the civil-military relations and the relative power of the
army. Furthermore, the same result can shed some light on why apparently similar countries
can evolve along very di¤erent paths of political and institutional developments, conditional
on an exogenous shock changing formal political institutions (e.g., the erosion of the power
and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union for the countries formerly members of the Warsaw
Pact).
Thirdly, our set-up o¤ers a set of rich comparative statics on how changes in exogenous
variables such as economic income, state scal capacity, natural resources rents or foreign aid
a¤ect the equilibrium dynamics of political institutions and political culture. Two e¤ects in
opposite directions are highlighted on the likelihood of democratic consolidation. Indeed, any
positive change in one of these variables tends to increase the size of the resources that a
government in power can potentially capture. On the one hand, this increases the military
incentives to attempt coups, which in turn requires higher levels of political culture for the
existence of a consolidated democracy where no coup is undertaken. On the other hand, a
democratic government has also higher incentives to increase public democratic investment.
Along the transition path to consolidated democracy, this triggers an increase in the transmis-
sion of political cultural values functional to democratic institutions. This speeds up the rate
at which a democratic regime can reach a state of consolidation. Hence to get to democracy
consolidation, the system has to pass a more di¢ cult threshold, but also disposes of a more
8This result is also somehow in contrast with the standard comparative politics perspective (reviewed below)
which argues that formal political institutions and political culture cannot be persistently incongruent in a
stable political system.
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powerful engineto reach such threshold. This logic explains why higher income or higher state
capacity may not automatically lead to democratic consolidation and therefore is consistent
with Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008), who nd no evidence supportive of (a
variety of versions of) the modernization hypothesis originally formulated by Lipset (1959).9
The previous argument applies as well to natural resource rents and foreign aid as long
as there is no institutional asymmetry across political regimes in terms of their capacity to
appropriate the related additional resources. Strong enough authoritarian military regimes
may however have a higher centralized capacity to monopolize natural resource rents than
democratic regimes prone to ine¢ cient and decentralized rent seeking behaviors. In such a
case, our analysis shows that an increase in natural resource revenues has a negative impact on
democratic consolidation and the sustainability of democratic cultural values. This illustrates
therefore a new channel for the possibility of a political natural resource cursea¤ecting neg-
atively political institutions and political culture. The same kind of logic indicates conversely
that conditional foreign aid disbursed only to democratic regimes has positive e¤ects, not only
in the short time for its dissuasive e¤ects on military coups, but also through the promotion
of democratic values ensuring long term democratic consolidation.
Finally, the last part of the paper o¤ers a discussion of some interesting case studies of de-
mocratization processes illustrating salient aspects of our theoretical framework. More specif-
ically, we consider the experiences of Post World War II Federal Republic of Germany and
Japan, as well as the historical case of Estonia during much of its 20th century history before
and after the Communist regime. The rst two cases are clear examples of major democratic
reforms and civic socialization programs induced from the outside that contributed, jointly
with intergenerational socialization, to the consolidation of democracy and the development
of a specic political culture in these countries. The third case illustrates the persistence
and partial malleability of democratic culture in an historical context characterized by various
political regime transitions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Section
2 describes the framework and Section 3 describes the equilibrium across political regimes.
In Section 4 we determine the optimal choice of transmission of political values. Section 5
describes the regime transitions and the dynamics of political culture. Section 6 reports the
results of some comparative statics analysis and some extensions are contained in Section 7.
9See however Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) for an alternative perspective.
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In Section 8 we discuss some evidence related to our model and Section 9 concludes. Some
proof are omitted from the text and reported in the Appendix.
1.1 Related literature
In the political economics literature, closely related to us is the recent paper by Persson and
Tabellini (2009) who consider theoretically and empirically the nexus between political and
economic development, through the accumulation of democratic capital. We depart from
that piece of work in two ways. First, we present a dynamic political game where both the
technology of production of political culture (by distinct agencies of socialization such as the
state and the households) and the role of the army as a player of the game are endogenized.
Second, in our setting political culture broadly dened (including investment in democratic
infrastructure) acts as a commitment device, whereas in Persson and Tabellini (2009) works as
a coordination mechanism in a global game structure. In this sense, political culture plays in
our model a similar role to political institutions, in the rst generation literature on political
transitions. However, there are two important di¤erences: rst, in our model political culture
is produced with a specic technology involving both the state and the family. Second, political
culture is potentially more persistent than formal political institutions, since it does not change
immediately (but adjusts endogenously over time), when the latter changes. In addition, we
provide some novel results concerning the dynamics and stochastic steady states of our political
game.
Another contribution closely connected to us is the recent paper by Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2012). It emphasizes the importance of individualist versus collectivist cultural values
for democratic transitions. These authors provide empirical evidence that countries with indi-
vidualistic culture tend to be more democratic, controlling for other determinants of democracy
emphasized in the literature. In their model however, cultural values are given and exoge-
nous to the institutional environment. Also they enter in a reduced form as xed di¤erential
probabilities to overcome collective action problems and replace autocrats by democratic in-
stitutions. In our setting, cultural values also have di¤erential impacts on collective actions
problems. However they evolve endogenously through joint actions of the state and families
and therefore depend on the environment and political regime in place. As well, given that
we provide a simple micro link between the extent of democratic culture and collective action,
our model generates endogenous probabilities to overcome collective action issues and, as a
consequence, interesting stochastic persistence of political regimes with non linear dynamics
towards consolidated and unconsolidated democratic institutions.
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In the political science literature, our paper also relates to Gerring, Bond, Barndt and
Moreno (2005) who argued that the growth of democratic stock has benecial e¤ects on the
accumulation of physical, human and politicalcapital, which fosters economic growth. This
contribution di¤ers from ours in two main respects: rst, it is essentially empirical; second,
it addresses the question, which we do not consider at all, of the relation between democracy
(i.e., democratic stock) and subsequent macroeconomic outcomes such as growth.
More generally, our work connects to other important bodies of literature in political theory
and political science, political economy, the economics of endogenous preferences transmission,
and in the recent burgeoning eld of behavioral political economy.
The rst contribution in the political science and political theory literature, is probably
the Politics of Aristotle. The great ancient Greek philosopher was perhaps the rst author to
recognize that a prerequisite for democracy is not only the existence of large middle class (i.e., of
a relatively equal distribution of income), but also the sharing of an egalitarian participatory
orientation among its citizens (Book IV, 1962 [352 BC]).10 Also, in his classic work De la
Démocratie en Amérique (1994 [1835]), Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that the emergence
and ourishing of democracy in America reects the political culture of its people, and in
particular their liberal and participatory orientations. Similarly Lasswell (1951) claimed that
the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes depends to a large extent on the nature
of mass political beliefs, while Inglehart (1989) also note political cultureas a crucial link
between economic development and democracy.
As already mentioned, our theory is partially consistent with the congruence doctrine on
institutional consolidation arguing that a political regime is stable only if it is congruent with
the prevailing political culture among its people (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966).11
According to that perspective, authoritarian regimes are stable only when people believe that
dictatorial powers are legitimate and, similarly democracy is stable when people are convinced
to be the ultimate source of political power. While our model includes dynamic complemen-
tarities between political cultural values and political institutions that are consistent with this
view, our analysis also illustrates the existence of equilibrium situations where the degree of
latent incongruence between values and political regimes can persist for signicant amounts of
time.
10Other classical authors who recognized the importance of political culture include Charles-Louis de Mon-
tesquieu, who in De LEsprit des Lois (1989 [1748]) argues that the positive laws and institutions governing a
society reect its dominant mentality.
11See also Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995), Norris (1999), Pharr and Putnam (2000), Mishler and Rose
(2001), Hadenius and Teorell (2005) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
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In political economy and comparative political economy, the present paper is most closely
associated to the literature on political transition pioneered by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001, 2006) and Boix (2003). A few recent papers have also addressed the related question of
what factors facilitate the endogenous transformation of a transitional democracy(under the
threat of a regime change such as a potential military coup) into a consolidated democracy,
where the median voter has full de jure and de facto power. In particular, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) allows for bidirectional political transitions, and, for a range of exogenous
parameters, features persistent transitions from democracy to oligarchy and the other way
around. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) also considers unconsolidated or transitional
democracyand show that can also potentially turn into a consolidated democracy along the
equilibrium path of the political game. Neither of these two papers though considers the role
of political culture and political socialization as a factor of regime consolidation, and the role
of cultural legacies to explain the emergence and persistence of democratic institutions.
Our set-up of cultural evolution builds on the literature on cultural transmission and en-
dogenous preferences formation as initiated in Bisin and Verdier (2000a, 2000b and 2001), and
recently extended by Tabellini (2008), Greif and Tadelis (2010), Bidner and Francois (2011)
and Acemoglu and Jackson (2012), to analyze the evolution of preferences for cooperation and
morality in political, market and organizational contexts.12 Our emphasis on the role of the
family as an agent of political socialization and promoter of collective political action resonates
as well with recent empirical works investigating the impact of family ties on generalized trust
and political participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), or the interactions between family
values and the demand for public regulation (Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano, 2010).
These papers, however are not concerned with explaining political transitions and institutional
regime consolidation.13
More directly related to us, a recent theoretical paper by Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi
(2012) also adapts the cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2001) to explain the
rise and fall of communism, exploring the interactions between economic incentives (capital
accumulation) and social preferences transmitted by ideology.14 They introduce two types of
agents (inequality-averse and ine¢ ciency-averse) and analyze the socioeconomic dynamics of
12See Bisin and Verdier (2011) and the references cited therein for an extensive review of this literature.
13Recent work by Dixit (2009) also considers the issue of collective cultural socialization in other-regarding
preferences to stimulate social cooperation and growth, but again does not address the issue of changes in
political regimes and institutions.
14See also Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) for an empirical analysis of the impact of centrally planned
versus market oriented institutions on individual preferences for redistribution and state intervention, using the
natural experimentof German separation and reunication.
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regime transition between liberal market economies and centrally-planned economies abolish-
ing private ownership. Our paper is complement to theirs. Indeed, while Farvaque, Mihailov
and Naghavi (2012) consider transitions between alternative economic systems, we focus on
transitions between alternative political systems (democracies and authoritarian systems). The
two aspects may not be independent but somehow highlight di¤erent perspectives of the role
of culture. Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (2012) consider the issue of ideological preferences
on the standard economic inequality/e¢ ciency trade-o¤. We emphasize the role of political
culture as a commitment device to solve political collective action problems. Also, we introduce
the family and the state as two sources of political indoctrination that work in a complemen-
tary way. Finally our model has some endogenous stochastic dynamic features related to the
uncertainty of political regimes transition.
We also connect to the behavioral economics literature and the political economy of beliefs
formation (Lott, 1999; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Aghion, Algan and Cahuc, 2011; Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006; Bénabou, 2008; Dessí, 2008; Saint-Paul, 2009). In some of these models,
individuals or governments make various kinds of investments, such as the strategic manipu-
lation of information, in changing the future preferences and beliefs of themselves or of their
citizens. This is related to our assumption that the state and the family may attempt, at some
cost, to shape the political culture of further generations. Our focus however is di¤erent from
these papers as we are concerned about the interactions and implications of these modes of
investments in the emergence and stability of political regimes in a given society.
Through some of our comparative statics, the paper relates to the literature on the political
economy of the resources curse (e.g., Torvik, 2002; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006).
With respect to that literature, we highlight a new cultural channelthrough which natural
resources may a¤ect the functioning of political institutions in the long term. Finally, although
our focus is di¤erent, our comparative statics of economic income on political culture also
connects indirectly to the literature on cultural di¤usion and economic development (Ashraf
and Galor, 2007; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009).
2 The basic setup
We consider an economy populated by a countable innity of non-overlapping generations of
agents living for two periods. Each generation is formed by a continuum of agents of measure
one. Agents are identical but di¤er along two dimensions. One is their occupation, which
can be either working as producer or being employed in the army. The military has measure
11
x < 1=2 and must be formed at each point in time in order to provide basic goods such
as national defense and law and order. We assume that forming an army is always optimal
for every government in o¢ ce, even though the army may use its de facto political power
generated by the monopoly of the means of coercion in order to replace a civilian government
with a military regime. Producers or citizens have size 1   x > 1=2 and productivity and
income equal to A. Individuals also di¤er in their attitude towards democracy and will be
distinguished between committed and uncommitted to democracy. The former derive utility
from defending democratic institutions from military coups or from opposing to authoritarian
regimes (revolution), while the latter do not. ic is an indicator function equal to 1 if the
individual is committed, and 0 if he is uncommitted; qt 2 [0; 1] will denote the share of
committed citizens of generation t in the society.
The political regime of the country can be either a democracy (s = D) or a military
dictatorship (s = M). In a democracy, collective decisions are made by a leader elected
with majoritarian elections. In a military dictatorship instead the military commander is in
power. Political transitions occur instantaneously and can take place due to the occurrence of
either a coup (transition from D to M), or to a rebellion of citizens against a military regime
(transition fromM to D). We assume that regime changes can take place in the second period
of life cycle only. Therefore, s1t = s
2
t 1 denotes the political regime in the rst period of life
of generation t, which is inherited from the previous generation, and also corresponds to the
regime at the beginning of the second period; the political regime that emerges in the second
period of life will be denoted with s2t . The political regime in place at beginning of each period,
sit 2 fD;Mg with i = 1; 2, and the political culture of the society, corresponding to the taste
for democracy, qt 2 [0; 1], will be the two state variables of the game.
If the military attempts a coup, this is successful with probability 1 if there is no opposition
by the citizens, while the coup fails when the share of committed agents in the society q is
higher than a certain threshold q 2 (0; 1). The threshold q is stochastic and has a distribution
f(q). Therefore,
F (q)  Pr (q  q) =
qZ
0
f(q)dq
represents the probability that the coup is not successful. We will later assume that F 0 (q) =
f(q) is not too increasing. We also assume that each soldier bears a cost T > 0 when the
military undertakes a coup.
The preferences of the producer i of generation born at time t 2 [0;1) can be represented
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as follows
U it = u
i
t;1 + Et

uit;2
	
= cit;1 + Gt;1 + Et

cit;2 + Gt;2 + 
i
o
 
icb2t   
	
; (1)
where uit;j is the instantaneous utility in period j 2 f1; 2g, Et is the expected value operator
conditional on the information available at the rst period of life and no discounting is assumed.
Expression (1) reects the assumption that the per-period utility function depends linearly
on a set of arguments which include the private good consumption, cit;j , and the potential
consumption of a public good Gt;j ;  > 0 is the taste for the public good. In addition, when
individuals oppose to a military coup or attempt a rebellion against a military regime they pay
a cost  > 0. io is an indicator function equal to 1 if the agents opposes to a coup, and it is 0
otherwise. However, individuals may derive utility from this opposition if they are committed to
defend democracy (ic = 1). This utility corresponds to the total level of ideological investment
in democratic indoctrination by the state (or shortly, the public democratic investment)
bt;2 = bt + "t;
where bt is the level produced by the government at time t (rst period of life), and "t is an
exogenous shock to public democratic investment uniformly distributed between 0 and b whose
realization is known at the beginning of the second period of life. The cost of production of
public democratic investment is ~C (b), with ~C 0 (b) > 0, ~C 00 (b) > 0, ~C 00 (b) > 0 and ~C (0) = 0.
We will denote with i 2 fc; ug the committed and the uncommitted individuals respectively.
When the individual is in the army, he receives the wage w and does not get utility from
the public good G (i.e.,  = 0). His cost of e¤ort for the provision of national defense is h > 0;
et;j is an indicator function equal to 1 if the soldier puts e¤ort, and it is equal to 0 otherwise.
Hence, the expected utility of the military in the rst period of life is
Umt = u
m
t;1 + Et

umt;2
	
= cmt;1 + et;1h+ Et

cmt;2 + et;2h
	
:
We also allow the military to undertake investments that increase the cost of rebellion for
the citizens when the army is in power. We assume that an increase  > 0 in the individual
cost of rebellion implies a cost for the government equal to ~CM (), with ~C 0M () > 0,
~C 00M () > 0 and ~CM (0) = 0.
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The scal instrument available to every government is proportional taxation of incomes; we
assume that taxes generate no distortions as long as they are set at a level  below some thresh-
old ^ representing the potential scal capacityof the state, and distortions are prohibitively
15 It is clear from the framework that this investment in repression by the military could also be interpreted
as an investment in indoctrination against cultural values committed to democracy.
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high for levels higher than ^ . Moreover, we capture distortions generated by a military dicta-
torship by assuming that military government is potentially less competentthan a civilian
government in raising taxes. This means that if the army sets taxes at  t, it only collects
revenues  t per unit of tax base where  < 1 is a measure of the military appropriation
capacity.
The government budget constraint in period j of life of generation t under democracy reads
wt;jx+Gt;j + It;j ~C (bt)   t;jA (1  x) : (2)
The left hand side are total expenditures, given by the wage bill of the army, the public good
provision and the cost ~C (bt) to produce the level bt of democratic capital. It;j is an indicator
function equal to 1 for the rst period of life (j = 1) and equal to 0 in the second period
(j = 2) since bt is produced in the rst period only. The right hand side of (2) represents the
revenues and takes into account that a mass x of low-skill agents are part of the army and do
not produce any output. The government budget constraint under dictatorship is till given by
(2) with the exception that the expenditure on the public democratic investment is replaced
by the cost of the additional repression ~CM ().
Savings are not allowed and therefore private good consumption is always equal to the
net disposable income for each agent, i.e., cit;j = (1   t;j)Ai. We also assume that shirking
soldiers are caught with a probability  2 (0; 1), and that there is limited liability so that the
soldier caught shirking loses his wage for one period. The incentive-compatibility constraint,
wt;j   h  (1  )wt;j , leads to the following e¢ ciency wage
wt;j = h=: (3)
Political culture represented by the commitment of the individuals toward democracy is
transmitted from parents to child. In particular, we assume that the process of transmission of
political values is imperfect in the sense that parents are successful in transmitting their culture
to o¤springs only with some probability  2 (0; 1). With the complementary probability 1  ,
the o¤spring takes the values of a citizen chosen randomly in the population. This means
that he will be committed with probability q and uncommitted with probability 1   q. The
cost H () for the parent of transmitting his political culture to the o¤spring is increasing and
convex in the probability  of being successful, i.e., H 0 () > 0, H 00 () > 0 and H (0) = 0.
The structure and timing of events of the political game played by the generation born at
time t is as follows and is summarized in Figure 1.
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[Figure 1 about here]
At the beginning of the rst period of life of a generation t, political institutions are
inherited from the previous period (i.e., s1t = s
2
t 1) and political transitions are not possible.
The government in o¢ ce, chooses the following set of policy variables f t;1;Gt;1;wt;1; bt;tg,
i.e., taxes, public good, military wages and the public democratic investment, or the investment
in repression if the regime is nondemocratic. The policy chosen is implemented and the stage-
game ends.
In the second period of generation t, political transitions are feasible, and events take place
according to the following timing.
If the initial political state is democracy (s1t = D), then:
1. The exogenous shock to public democratic investment "t is realized.
2. The army decides whether to attempt a coup or not.
3. The low-skill agents decide whether to mobilize in defense of democracy. In case of no
mobilization, the coup is successful with probability 1 and a political transition to a military
regime immediately occurs (s2t = M). If there is mobilization, the coup fails with probability
F (qt), so that s2t = D, and succeeds with probability 1  F (qt), so that s2t =M .
4. The pivotal agent, i.e. the median voter if s2t = D or the military commander if s
2
t =M ,
decides taxes, public spending and military wages, and the game ends.16
If the initial political state is military dictatorship (s1t =M), then:
1. The citizens decide whether to mobilize against the military or not (after "t is known).
2. If there is no mobilization, the political regime remains a dictatorship (s2t = s
1
t= M).
If there is mobilization, this is successful with probability F (qt) and determines a transition
to democracy (s2t = D), while the rebellion is unsuccessful with probability 1 F (qt), and the
political system remains authoritarian (s2t =M).
3. Again, the pivotal agent decides taxes, public spending and military wages, and the
game ends.
16 In principle, the military commander may want to give up power to democracy at the beginning of the
second period. However, if this option is not exercised in the rst period, then it is not exercised in the second
one.
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3 Equilibrium across regimes
3.1 Preliminary results
The subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic political game described above can be computed
by solving the two-periods political game played by each generation. We make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1 :  > 1=(1  x).
Assumption 2 : (1  ^)A+ ^A(1  x)  xh=  (1  )h=.
Assumption 3 : T  ^A(1  x)=x  h=.
Assumption 1 ensures that the citizens always want to provide the public good G when in
power. Assumption 2 guarantees that the participation constraint of soldiers is never binding
under democracy (as we will show next, the left hand side is the per period utility of citizens
and the right hand side is the utility of soldiers in a democratic political system). Assumption
3 implies that the military nds optimal undertaking a coup if no opposition is expected.
We solve the game by backward-induction starting from the analysis of the second period
of the game for generation t, and then analyze the equilibrium in rst period of life.
We rst start describing the scal policies across regimes in the two periods of life.
The scal policy of a democratic government maximizes the per-period utility function
of the citizens described in (1), subject to the government budget constraint (2) and to the
incentive-compatibility constraint of the army (3). In the second period of the life cycle, this
implies setting taxes at the maximum rate ^ , paying the e¢ ciency wage to the military and
spend all remained revenues in the public good. In the rst period, a democratic government
has also to decide the public democratic investment bt. Similarly, in the second period of life,
a military government sets taxes at ^ and spends all revenues in military wages; the policy is
the same in the rst period except that it also decides the investment in repression t. The
following proposition summarizes the optimal scal policy.
Proposition 1 The scal policy of a democratic government is
Dt;1 = ^ ; G
D
t;1 = ^A(1  x)  xh=   ~C(bt); wDt;1 = h=;
Dt;2 = ^ ; G
D
t;2 = ^A(1  x)  xh=; wDt;2 = h=;
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and the dictatorial policy is
Mt;1 = ^ ; G
M
t;1 = 0; w
M
t;1 = [^A (1  x)  ~CM (t)]=x;
Mt;2 = ^ ; G
M
t;2 = 0; w
M
t;2 =  w
M ; wM = ^A(1  x)=x;
where bt and t will be determined below.
We now analyze the conditions under which the citizens undertake an opposition to a
military coup. First note that each individual is atomistic and his behavior does not change
the successful probability of the coup. Therefore, from (1) it is immediate that for a given level
of public democratic investment bt;2, committed agents oppose a coup if the level of democratic
stock of committed agents is higher than a certain threshold, bt;2  . In this case, the coup
fails with probability F (qt) and s2t = D, while it succeeds with probability 1  F (qt) and the
military dictatorship is established, s2t =M . When bt;2 < , the coup succeeds with probability
1. Similarly, when bt;2   and the political regime is a military dictatorship (s1t = M), there
is a rebellion against this regime. With probability F (qt) this is successful and there is a
transition to democracy (s2t = D), while the rebellion fails with probability 1  F (qt) and the
military remains in power (s2t =M).
We here study under what conditions the military undertakes a coup and when it does not.
Consider rst the case where bt;2  , so that there is opposition by citizens. The military
nds optimal to undertake a coup when its expected payo¤ from a coup is higher than the
payo¤ from democracy, uM (coup)  uM (D). From the militarys expected payo¤ of a coup
uM (coup) = F (qt)u
M (D) + [1  F (qt)]uM (M;)  T;
where the utility in dictatorship is
uM (M;) =  wM   h = ^A (1  x) =x  h; (4)
and the utility in democracy
uM (D) = wD   h = 1  

h; (5)
follows that the military will attempt a coup when
uM (M;)  uM (D) + T
1  F (qt) : (6)
Since the left hand side of condition (6) is increasing in  and the right hand side is increasing
in qt, condition (6) is equivalent to
qt < ~q();
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where ~q() is the level of q satisfying (6) with equality. The interpretation is that the military
undertakes a coup when the pervasiveness of committedindividuals democratic institutions
is below some threshold ~q(). This result is consistent with the claim by Juan Linz that
authoritarian coups and regimes require the backing of signicant segment of the mass
population (Alexander, 2002, p. 5).
When bt;2 < , coups are successful with probability 1 (as there is no opposition), and the
condition for a military coup attempt, uM (coup)  uM (D), becomes uM (M;)  uM (D)+T ,
which corresponds to (6) with F (qt) = 0. Assumption 3 ensures that this condition always
holds and therefore that the military undertakes a coup when there is no opposition by the
citizens. If such a condition did not hold, then this means that the military is so ine¢ cient in
extracting rents that it never nds optimal trying to get to power, which would easily lead to
a consolidated democracy. Assumption 3 rules out this possibility as this is not an interesting
case from the perspective of our theory.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Independently on the presence of opposition, the military undertakes a coup
when qt < ~q(), where ~q() is implicitly dened by the following condition [1 F (qt)][uM (M;) 
uM (D)] = T . When qt  ~q(), the military never attempt a coup if opposition is expected
(bt;2 < ).
Proof. In the text.
3.2 Equilibrium public democratic investment
The optimal choice of the public democratic investment by the democratic government depends
on the probability that the committed citizens will oppose to a military coup, which is given
by
Pr("t     bt)  P (bt) =
b+ bt   
b
; (7)
and on the probability of no opposition equal to Pr("t <   bt)  1 P (bt) = (  bt)=b. Two
cases can be considered depending on whether ~q() is larger or smaller than 1=2:
i) Case ~q() > 1=2: Consider rst the situation where the military undertakes a coup
independently from opposition (i.e., qt < ~q() see Proposition 2). When 0 < qt  1=2,
the uncommitted agents are the majority and choose the provision of the public democratic
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investment bt that solves the following optimization problem17
max
bt
Uut (D) = [a  C(bt)] + (1  ^)A+ P (bt)F (qt)[a  (1  ^)A]; (8)
where C (bt)   ~C (bt) and
a  (1  ^)A+ ^A(1  x)  xh= (9)
is the per-period total utility of the citizens under democracy (gross of the public democratic
investment). The rst component of (8) in square brackets is the utility in the rst period of
life, while the remaining part is the expected utility in the second period. This comes from
the fact that there is no opposition to the coup with probability 1 P (bt), so that the military
will be in power with certainty and the utility of the citizens is (1  ^)A. With probability
P (bt), there is opposition to the coup; this fails with probability F (qt), the system remains
democratic and the citizenspayo¤ is a, while it succeeds with probability 1   F (qt) and the
citizens get (1  ^)A.
When instead 1=2 < qt < ~q(), the committed individuals are in power. Their utility is
the same as the uncommitted plus the net expected payo¤ from opposition, which is equal to
Et f(bt + "t)  jbt + "t     0g =
 
b+ bt   
2
2b
; (10)
where we have used the fact that "t is uniformly distribution between 0 and b. Therefore, the
committed optimization problem becomes
max
bt
U ct (D) = a  C (bt) + (1  ^)A+ P (bt)F (qt) [a  (1  ^)A] +
 
b+ bt   
2
2b
: (11)
When qt  ~q(), the committed are in power and the military does not attempt a coup
with opposition, but undertakes it with no opposition, i.e. the following condition holds
uM (D) + T=[1  F (qt)]  uM (M;) > uM (D) + T:
The utility of committed and uncommitted citizens coincide, as there is never a coup with
opposition in equilibrium, and the maximization problem is identical to (8) with F (qt) = 1.
ii) Case ~q () < 1=2: Similar reasoning as before shows that for qt 2 [0; ~q ()); the un-
committed agents are in power and the optimal policy bt solves problem (8). Similarly for
17We are here implicitly assuming that soldiers do not vote. Allowing them to vote would only change the
threshold below which the uncommitted are in power; rather than qt  1=2 this happens when qt  1=2(1  x),
as the military always (weakly) prefer the uncommitted citizenspolicy to the committed one.
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qt 2 [~q () ; 1], simple inspection provides that there is no coup with opposition in equilibrium.
The utility of committed and uncommitted citizens coincide, and the optimal policy bt solves
a maximization problem identical to (8) with F (qt) = 1.
The following assumption ensures that the level of public democratic investment chosen by
the government when qt  ~q () is such that there will be opposition to coups independently
on the realization of the random shock "t (i.e., bt = b = ).
Assumption 4 :
 
1=b

[a  (1  ^)A]   1=b [^A(1  x)  xh=]  C 0 () :
The following proposition characterizes then fully the choice of public democratic invest-
ment by the democratic government.
Proposition 3 - When ~q () > 1=2. The optimal public democratic investment under democ-
racy (s1t = D) is equal to
1. bu (qt) = min fbu (qt) ; g, where bu (qt) is dened by the following equation
 C 0 (bt) +
 
1=b

F (qt) [a  (1  ^)A] = 0; (12)
when qt 2 [0; 1=2] and the uncommitted citizens are in power;
2. bc (qt) is dened by
 C 0 (bt) +
 
1=b

F (qt) [a  (1  ^)A] +
 
b+ bt   

=b = 0: (13)
when qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()) and the committed individuals are the majority;
3. b =  when qt 2 [~q () ; 1].
Moreover, bc (qt) and bu (qt) are both increasing in qt, with bc (qt) > bu (qt).
- When ~q () < 1=2, the policy at point (1) applies for qt 2 [0; ~q ()) and point (3) for
qt 2 [~q () ; 1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following features of the optimal public democratic investment are worth noting. First,
also the uncommitted citizens are in favor of providing the public democratic investment (note
that bu(qt) is always strictly positive) and this comes from the fact that they nd optimal
inducing the committed to defend the threatened democracy. Second, committed citizens
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always want to provide a public democratic investment higher than the level preferred by the
uncommitted (bc(qt) > bu(qt)) because they obtain a consumption value from it. Third, there
is a complementarity between the political culture, transmitted by the family, and the public
democratic investment provided by the state. This complementarity arises from the fact that
more di¤used political culture (a higher fraction qt of committed individuals) increases the
probability that a military coup fails when the committed oppose to it (F (qt) is increasing
in qt). This in turn increases the returns of a democratic government to invest in democratic
indoctrination.
Figure 2 reports some examples for the level of provision of public democratic investment
for all values of q.
[Figure 2 about here]
3.3 Political equilibrium in democracy
The following proposition describes the political equilibrium when the initial political regime
is democratic.
Proposition 4 Consider the case where ~q () > 1=2. The equilibrium under democracy (s1t =
D) is the following.
1. If qt 2 [0; 1=2], the military always undertakes a coup, and the committed citizens op-
pose when "t     bu (qt), which happens with probability P (bu (qt)) determined by
(7) with bu (qt) dened in Proposition 3. When citizens oppose, coup attempts fail with
probability F (qt) and the political system remains democratic (s2t = s
1
t = D), and succeed
with probability 1   F (qt) and the system transition to dictatorship (s2t = M). When
citizens do not oppose (i.e., "t <    bu (qt)), dictatorship is established with probability
1. Therefore, the per-period probability that democracy persists is P (bu (qt))F (qt);
2. if qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()), the equilibrium is the same as the one described at point (1) ex-
cept that the committed citizens oppose when "t     bc (qt) and the corresponding
probability is P (bc (qt)); therefore, the per-period probability that democracy persists is
P (bc (qt))F (qt);
3. if qt 2 [~q () ; 1], the military never undertakes coups (since there is always opposition by
the citizens, "t     b = 0) and the political system remains democratic.
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When ~q () < 1=2, point (1) applies for qt 2 [0; ~q ()) and point (3) for qt 2 [~q () ; 1].
Proof. Straightforward from the text.
The political equilibrium under democracy can be summarized as follows. When political
culture is lower than a certain threshold, qt < ~q (), the military always attempts a coup.
The probability that the coup succeeds and that the political system transition to dictatorship
is negatively related to the level of political culture in the society and to the level of public
democratic investment chosen in the previous period. When political culture is su¢ ciently
high, qt  ~q (), the military never attempts a coup (as the committed would always oppose
to it), and there are never transitions to military regimes.
3.4 Equilibrium investment in repression
When the military is in power (st = M), it always chooses the maximum tax rate ^ and no
provision of the public good G and revenues are spent in military wages. In the rst period of
life, the military also chooses the investment in repression t which reduces the probability
that citizens will rebel against its rule in the following period. The maximization problem of
the military reads
max
t
UMt (M) = [^A(1  x)=x  CM (t)] (14)
+P (t)

F (qt)u
M (D) + (1  F (qt))uM (M;)

+ (1  P (t))uM (M;) ;
with CM (t)  ~CM (t) =x. The rst component of (14) is the utility of the military in
the rst period of life and the remaining part of this expression is the expected utility in the
second period. This takes into account that rebellions take place with probability
P (t)  Pr ("t   +t) =
b  ( +t)
b
= 1   +tb ; (15)
and succeed with probability F (qt); the per-period utility of the military under democracy
and dictatorship uM (D) and uM (M;) are given by (5) and (4) respectively.
The following proposition denes the optimal investment in repression.
Proposition 5 The optimal investment in repression by the military government (s1t = M)
is t = min

Mt ;
b  	, where Mt is implicitly dened by the following condition
 C 0M (t) +
 
1=b

F (qt)

uM (M;)  uM (D) = 0: (16)
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Proof. Equation (16) is the rst order condition of problem (14).18 Since there is no
rebellion when b   +Mt independently on the realization of "t, it is never optimal to set
Mt >
b   , which leads to t .
3.5 Political equilibrium in military dictatorships
When t = b  , the military nds optimal to invest so many resources in increasing their
repressive apparatus that rebellions are never possible, and dictatorship consolidates. When
instead Mt < b , there is always a positive probability, given by (15), that the (committed)
citizens attempt a rebellion (i.e., that "t >  + M ). This implies that a transition to
democracy will take place at some point. Since Mt is increasing in qt,
19 there is a unique
level of q = qM , such thatMt (qM ) = b . For all qt > qM , Mt (qt) > b  andt = b ,
while t = Mt (qt) < b    for all qt < qM . If qM < ~q(), then the military dictatorship
becomes permanent when qt 2 [qM ; ~q()) because the military regime invests a large amount
of resources in repression, while dictatorship never consolidates when qM > ~q ().
The following condition ensures that there is always a positive probability that rebellions
take place and that the political system transitions to democracy independently on the level
of political culture in the society since it implies that Mt < b   for all 0  qt  ~q().
Condition 1: qM > ~q().
The following proposition summarizes the political equilibrium in military dictatorship.
Proposition 6 If Condition 1 is satised, the committed citizens undertake a rebellion when
"t  +t , which happens with probability P (t ) determined by (15). The rebellion succeeds
with probability F (qt) and the political system transitions to democracy (s2t = D), while it fails
with probability 1   F (qt) and the system remains a dictatorship (s2t = s1t = M). Therefore,
the per-period probability that dictatorship survives is 1 P (t )F (qt). If Condition 1 is not
satised, P (t ) = 0 for all qt > qM and military dictatorship survives with probability 1 once
it is established when qt 2 [qM ; ~q()).
Proof. In the text.
18Note that the second order condition of problem (14) is always satised given that C00M (t) < 0.
19Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to qt, we obtain that
@Mt =@qt = F
0(qt)[u
M (M;)  uM (D)]=[bC00M (t)] > 0:
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4 Transmission of political values
We here analyze the dynamics of the political culture in the society. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that parents are naive in the decision of transmitting their cultural traits, in the
sense that they do not take into account the variation across generations in the composition q.
The maximized altruistic expected utility of children for each committed parent is
max
c
[c + (1  c) qt]V cct+1 + (1  c) (1  qt)V cut+1  H (c) ; (17)
where H (c) is the cost for the parent of transmitting his political culture to the o¤spring,
while V cct+1 and V
cu
t+1 denote the utility that a committed parent derives respectively from a
committed and from an uncommitted child. The probability that the child is committed is the
sum of the probability c that he gets the same social values of the parent, and the probability
(1  c) qt that he will be committed by getting his values from the society. With probability
1   c the parent fails in transmitting his social values and the child gets them from society,
so that he will be committed with probability qt and uncommitted with probability 1  qt.
The rst order condition of (17) denes the optimal transmission probability c chosen by
a committed parent20
(1  qt)V ct+1 = H 0 (c) ; (18)
where V ct+1  V cct+1   V cut+1.
Similarly, the maximized altruistic expected utility of children for each uncommitted parent
is
max
u
[u + (1  u) (1  qt)]V uut+1 + (1  u) qtV uct+1  H (u) ;
where u is probability that the uncommitted parent is successful in transmitting his political
culture to the o¤spring, and V uut+1 and V
uc
t+1 denote the utility that a uncommitted parent derives
respectively from an uncommitted and from a committed child. The rst order condition
dening the optimal transmission probability u is
qtV
u
t+1 = H
0 (u) ; (19)
where V ut+1  V uut+1   V uct+1.
The share of committed individuals in the generation t+ 1 is
qt+1 = qt [c + (1  c) qt] + (1  qt) (1  u) qt; (20)
20H 00 () > 0 guarantees that the second order condition is satised.
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where c+ (1  c) qt is the fraction of children from committed parents that become commit-
ted, and (1  u) qt is the share of children from uncommitted parents getting the committed
political values.21 Therefore, the change in the share of committed individuals in the society
from the generation at t and t+ 1 is dened as
qt+1  qt+1   qt = qt (1  qt) (c   u) : (21)
The steady state level of the composition of society under no change in the political regime,
qt+1 = 0, implies that c = u and, therefore, H 0 (c) = H 0 (u). Using (18) and (19), this
leads to the following steady state condition
V c
V u
=
q
1  q : (22)
where V c and V u are the values of V ct+1 and V
u
t+1 at the steady state equilibrium.
4.1 The conditional dynamics of political culture
When qt 2 [~q () ; 1], there are no military coups against democracy when there is opposition,
and Assumption 4 guarantees that this is always the case. Since the committed citizens never
enjoy the payo¤ from opposing a coup, the utility of committed and uncommitted are identical
and V ct+1 = V
u
t+1 = 0 for all qt  ~q(). This implies that citizens do not put e¤ort in trying
to have their children with the same traits, i.e., c = u = 0, which will lead to no change in
q over time. This also means that there will be no coups and regime transitions in all future
periods, and that democracy is consolidated.
When qt 2 [0; ~q ()), the military undertakes coups independently on the level of public
democratic investment. For the committed parents, we have that
V ct+1  V cct+1   V cut+1 = Et;2 f(bt+1 + "t+1)  jbt+1 + "t+1     0g =
 
b+ bt+1   
2
2b
; (23)
where bt+1 = bt = bi (qt) is the expected equilibrium public democratic investment for the
next generation, which is equal to the current one since agents are naive and do not take into
account the change in q for the next generation. The expression in (23) is the same as the
one in (10) and corresponds to the expected utility that a committed citizen gets from the
opposition to a military coup.
21With probability 1   u each uncommitted parent is unsuccessful in transmitting his political values, and
the child gets the same values of a citizen randomly chosen in the population, so becoming committed with
probability qt.
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For an uncommitted parent we obtain that
V ut+1  V uut+1   V uct+1 = 
b+ bt+1   
b
; (24)
which is the expected cost of opposing a military coup. This comes from the fact that an
uncommitted parent will evaluate the utility of his child from opposing a coup with his own
preferences, which implies that he will take into account the losses from opposition but not
the gains that the committed child will get from it.
Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), we obtain that the steady state composition qe of
society under democracy is implicitly dened by the following equation
be (qe) + b  
2
=
qe
1  qe : (25)
The analysis for the dynamics of the political culture under dictatorship is very similar and
is reported in the proof of the following proposition that characterizes the conditional cultural
dynamics across regimes.
Proposition 7 The conditional cultural dynamics under democracy (st = D) is the following.
1. When qt 2 [1=2; 1] the steady state value of the share of committed citizens is ~qc implicitly
dened by
bc (~qc) + b  
2
=
~qc
1  ~qc ; (26)
qt+1 > qt when qt < ~qc, and qt+1 < qt when qt > ~qc.
2. When qt 2 [0; 1=2] the steady state value ~qu of the share of committed citizens in the
society is given by
bu (~qu) + b  
2
=
~qu
1  ~qu ; (27)
qt+1 > qt when qt < ~qu, and qt+1 < qt when qt > ~qu.
3. The steady state value of the share of committed citizens under dictatorship (st = M)
is ~qM , dened by
b   (~qM )
2 (~qM )
=
~qM
1  ~qM ; (28)
qt+1 > qt when qt < ~qM , and qt+1 < qt when qt > ~qM .
4. The following ranking always holds: ~qM < ~qu < ~qc.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results in Proposition 7 importantly highlight the two-way complementarity between
the decisions of the family and the state on political socialization. As already noticed from
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Proposition 3, a higher level of political culture in the society (e.g., a higher value of q) increases
the incentive for a democratic state to provide public democratic investment. Conversely how-
ever there is also a dynamic complementarity that works in the opposite direction: other things
equal, when parents expect a relatively higher provision of public democratic investment by
the state for the next generation, they invest more in the transmission of democratic politi-
cal culture (i.e., qe is increasing in be). The explanation of this result is immediate from the
comparison of (23) and (24) which represent the expected net gains of the committed and
uncommitted parents from the transmission of their traits. A higher provision of public de-
mocratic investment increases the probability, P (bt+1) =
 
b+ bt+1   

=b, that the o¤spring
will oppose to coups, which rises the incentive of both groups for transmitting their own traits.
However, the payo¤ of the committed parents increases more than the one of the uncommitted
because committed individuals have an intrinsic value from opposition that is increasing in b.
This in turn explains why higher levels of public democratic investment increase the steady
state level of political culture.
Note that along with the two-way complementarity between family socialization and state
indoctrination, Proposition 7 is also partially consistent with the congruence doctrine between
political institutions and political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966). Such
doctrine says that there should be a denite congruence relationship between patterns of
political values and the nature of the political regime that prevails. Result 4 is suggestive of
such relationship. Indeed it indicates that controlling for regime stability, democratic culture
is less likely to prevail in authoritarian regimes than in democratic regimes (as ~qM < ~qu < ~qc).
Hence long term patterns of political culture tend to be congruent with long term stable
political structures. Note however that such congruence may be only partial. Indeed when
~qM > 0, the model generates a latent permanent degree of democratic political culture even
under long standing authoritarian regimes.22
Figure 3 describes the dynamics of political culture in democracy and dictatorship in the
special case where ~qu < 1=2 and ~qc < ~q ().
[Figure 3 about here]
22Such degree of partial congruence is consistent with the fact that in presence of shocks, long standing
authoritarian regimes may transit at some point to more democratic regimes, as has been observed for instance
in the case of the Arab Spring.
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5 Regime transitions and the dynamics of political culture
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium of the model for any given initial level
q0 of democratic culture.
Proposition 8 Let q0 be the initial value of political culture in the society. The equilibrium of
the model is the following. If q0 2 [~q () ; 1], democracy persists with probability 1 (consolidated
or permanent democracy).
1. When ~q () > 1=2, then
1.i) if ~qc  ~q () and ~qu < 1=2, there is a positive probability that democracy converges to
a permanent democracy for all q0 2 (1=2; ~q ()) (converging consolidating democracy),
while it consolidates with probability zero for all q0 2 [0; 1=2];
1.ii) if ~qc  ~q () and ~qu  1=2, there is a positive probability that democracy converges to a
permanent democracy for all q0 2 [0; ~q ()) (fully converging consolidating democracy);
1.iii) if ~qc < ~q (), there is a zero probability that democracy consolidates for all q0 2 [0; ~q ()).
2. When ~q ()  1=2, if ~qu  1=2, there is a positive probability that democracy converges
to a permanent democracy for all q0 2 [0; 1=2) while it never consolidates if ~qu < 1=2.
Examples of the equilibrium described in Proposition 8 are reported in Figures 4a4c.
[Figures 4a, 4b, 4c about here]
When q0 2 [~q () ; 1] there are no coups and no transitions to authoritarian regimes. Democ-
racy is therefore consolidated. Indeed, the level of public democratic investment bc (qt) is such
that the citizens would always oppose to coups attempt. The military does not nd opti-
mal undertaking coups when democratic political culture is su¢ ciently salient in society (i.e.,
q > ~q ()). Since committed citizens never enjoy the payo¤ from opposing to a coup, the utility
of committed and uncommitted agents are identical and both groups do not put any family
socialization e¤ort to transmit their own political culture. Given that cultural transmission
is only related to random matching oblique transmission, q remains constant over time and
democracy persists. This result suggests the existence of threshold e¤ects (due to political
culture) in democratic consolidation.
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When q0 2 (1=2; ~q ()), democracy is potentially unstable. The military undertakes coups
independently from the level of public democratic investment. However, public democratic
investment a¤ect the fraction of committed citizens that may oppose or not to coups. The
political system may remain democratic or transit to dictatorship. If the steady state level
of political culture ~qc is lower than the threshold value ~q () necessary for democratic con-
solidation, then the political system never converges to a permanent democracy since there
is always a reduction in the share of committed citizens as long as qt 2 (~qc; ~q ()). In this
case the equilibrium is characterized by oscillations between political regimes (see Figure 4a).
If instead ~qc  ~q () (because of the high level of the public democratic investment), then
committed citizens have higher incentives in transmitting their values than uncommitted ones.
Political culture will di¤use over time under democratic institutions for all qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()). If
opposition to coups is successful for some periods so that no transition to dictatorship takes
place, then at some point the share of individuals committed to defend democracy will be such
that it is not optimal for the military to undertake military coups (i.e., qt = ~q ()). In other
words, when ~qc  ~q () there is always a strict positive probability that democracy consolidates
(Figure 4b describes this case of converging consolidating democracy).
When ~qc  ~q () and ~qu  1=2, the share of committed citizens increases over time for
all values qt < ~q () when the system remains democratic. This implies that there is always
a positive probability that the political system converges to a permanent democracy for all
initial levels of political culture (see Figure 4c for an example of fully converging consolidating
democracy). When instead ~qu < 1=2, there is no possibility to converge to a permanent
democracy as long as qt < 1=2.
Finally, if ~q ()  1=2, then it is immediate to see that convergence to permanent democracy
takes place only when ~qu  1=2.
From Proposition 8 we also get the following important properties on the persistence and
consolidation of democracy.
Proposition 9 (Stochastic Persistence of Regimes) When a regime can be consolidated with
positive probability, then the more time the political system is in that regime, the more likely
that regime will occur next period.23
Proof. See the Appendix.
23 It can also be easily veried that for any q0 < ~q (), the probability that the political system converges to
a permanent democracy is (weakly) increasing in the steady state values of the share of committed citizens in
the society ~qu and ~qc.
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The two-way dynamic complementarity between political institutions and slow moving
political values is at the heart of our result of stochastic persistence of regimes. Indeed, the
longer a political regime is in place, the longer public policies are designed to promote the
evolution of cultural political values congruent with the preservation of that regime. This in
turn makes that regime more likely to survive in the future. Specically, parents optimally
choose to transmit political values that are congruent with the political regime they live in.
Therefore, when democracy survives, parents have higher incentives to transmit democratic
values and consequently the extent of democratic political culture in the society increases. In
turn, a higher degree of democratic culture makes it optimal for a democratic government to
invest more resources in public democratic indoctrination. This increases the survival likelihood
of democracy (as it makes it more likely for citizens to oppose to coups and to succeed).
Conversely, dictatorial regimes undertake repressive and propaganda actions that increase the
cost to opposition and reduce the incentives of families to transmit democratic values. In turn
this situation leads overtime to the di¤usion of a political culture less likely to support or make
revolutions against the regime. As a consequence, the longer the dictatorial regime is in place,
the lower the likelihood to democratic transition and the higher the probability of staying into
dictatorship.
6 Comparative statics
In this section we develop some comparative statics analysis trying to understand how some
variables, such as the level of state capacity, economic development, natural resources, foreign
aid and external threat a¤ect the transmission of political culture and the process of democratic
consolidation.
To this aim, we now assume that the economy has a certain amount of natural resources
N , that are property of the state, and that it may receive some aid H from foreign countries.
We also assume that foreign aid is conditional on the political system being democratic; st will
be an indicator function equal to 1 if the system is a democracy and 0 if it is a dictatorship.
This implies that the government budget constraint under democracy can be rewritten as
^A (1  x)  xh=  GD   ~C (b) +N + sH = 0;
with ~C (b) = 0 in the rst period of life cycle. This implies that uct = a   C (bt), where the
term a is now dened as follows
a  (1  ^)A+ ^A (1  x)  xh= + N + stH: (29)
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Once we take into account that the term a is dened as in (29) rather than (9), the analysis
of the equilibrium under democracy is unchanged.
Condition (6) dening when the military undertakes a coup also in presence of citizens
opposition is unchanged, but uM (M;) in (4) is now given by the following expression
uM (M;) = ^A (1  x) =x+N=x  h;
while uM (D) is still given by (5). This implies that (6) can be rewritten as qt  ~q (), with
~q () = F 1

1  T
^A (1  x) =x+N=x  h=

: (30)
In analyzing the e¤ects of the variables (^ ; A;N; h;H; ) on the process of consolidation
of democracy, we need to consider two e¤ects of these variables. The rst e¤ect is on ~q ().
Higher values of ~q () reduce the probability of consolidation of democracy because (i) the size
of the region [~q () ; 1] where democracy is consolidated shrinks, and (ii) the probability that
the steady state value of the share of committed citizens in the society ~qc (or both ~qc and ~qu)
is higher than ~q () lowers, which makes the transition to permanent democracy less likely.
The second e¤ect of these variables is on the steady state values of the share of committed
citizens ~qu and ~qc (recall that the probability of the political system converging to a permanent
democracy is increasing in these values for a given level of ~q ()). Then, we also remind that
the above set of variable of interest a¤ect the thresholds ~qu and ~qc only through the levels of
public democratic investment bu (q) and bc (q), and that ~qu and ~qc are increasing in bu (q) and
bc (q) respectively.
The e¤ects of the variables considered on the probability of consolidation of democracy are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 The threshold ~q () is increasing in ^ , A, and N , it is decreasing in h and ,
and it is independent on H. The thresholds bu (q) and bc (q) are both increasing in ^ , A, and N ,
and both decreasing in h and H, while they are independent on . This implies that the overall
e¤ect of a higher level of state capacity ^ , economic development A, natural resources N , and
external threat h on the consolidation of democracy is ambiguous, while more foreign aid H
that is conditioned on the existence of a democratic political system, or a lower appropriation
capacity  by the military, increases the probability that democracy becomes permanent.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results contained in Proposition 10 can be explained as follows. On the one hand,
higher levels of state capacity ^ , economic development A, and natural resources N , increase
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the amount of resources that the military can appropriate once in power; this reduces the region
of parameters where the military does not undertakes coups and democracy is consolidated
(i.e., ~q () increases and the region [~q () ; 1] shrinks). On the other hand, this also implies that
the citizens have higher incentives to defend democracy and increase the public democratic
investments (bu (q) and bc (q) are higher). This translates into stronger opposition against
military coups and higher accumulation of political culture in the society (i.e., higher q). This
in turn favors the process of consolidation of democracy.
Similarly, a higher level of external threat, represented by an increase in the e¤ort parameter
h of the military, also has two opposing e¤ects. First, it leads to larger rents to the military
under democracy, so reducing its incentive to undertake power. This increases the region where
democracy is consolidated. At the same time, higher rents to the military reduce the net payo¤
of citizens from democracy relative to military dictatorship. Therefore, citizens also have lower
incentives to defend democracy and to provide public democratic investment, leading to lower
accumulation of political culture in the society (lower q).
Finally, more foreign aid H conditioned on the existence of a democratic system only
generates a positive e¤ect on democratic consolidation. Indeed, such a change does not a¤ect
the incentives of the military to take power, as these resources cannot be appropriated by them.
At the same time, it unambiguously stimulates an unconsolidated democratic government to
invest in public democratic infrastructures to defend democracy from a military coup. As a
consequence, foreign aid conditioned to democracy stimulates indirectly the spreading of a
political culture congruent to the regime and helps its consolidation. In contrast, a lower value
of the military appropriation capacity  reduces the incentives of the military to take power,
while it has no e¤ect on public democratic investments. As a result, such a change increases
the probability that democracy consolidates.
7 Extensions
The previous section showed that higher state capacity, income and natural resources rents
have ambiguous e¤ects on democratic consolidation. A positive change in these variables leads
both to more resources that the military can potentially appropriate and increased incentives
for a democratic government to invest in public democratic infrastructures. In this section,
we show that these comparative statics are unambiguous when there is some strong enough
asymmetry across political regimes on the capacity of appropriation of the resources.24
24This is already the case for instance for conditional foreign aid in the previous section.
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 Ine¢ ciency of appropriation of the military
Consider rst the situation where the military appropriation capacity  depends negatively
on productivity A or the fraction of committed citizens q, so that   (A; q) with @=@A < 0
and @=@q < 0. This case can reect the fact that richer and more productive economies are
technologically more sophisticated and specialized. Therefore it may require special compe-
tencies to extract e¢ ciently resources from the country, competencies that the military do not
have. As well, it may be more di¢ cult for the military to get the cooperation from citizens to
tax e¢ ciently the economy. Such cooperation is more di¢ cult to obtain when the legitimacy
of the regime is put into question, something that is more likely to happen when there are
more committed citizens in the society.
In this case, an increase in A may unambiguously favor the consolidation of democracy
because it not only generate an increase in public democratic investment but also a reduction
of the threshold ~q () above which the military does not undertake coups. Indeed, it can
be easily observed from (30) that an increase in A reduces ~q () when @ [A(A; q)] =@A =
(A; q) + A@=@A < 0, which is the case if  @=@A > 0 is strong enough. In words, the
increase in productivity helps the consolidation of democracy by making the military regime
less e¢ cient in extracting rents.25
 The e¤ects of rent-seeking with natural resources in heterogeneous societies
Consider now the e¤ect of natural resources on democracy consolidation. A possible asym-
metry in resource appropriation between a strong authoritarian regime and a democratic regime
may reside in the ability for the rst regime to restrict access to rent seeking and to capture
resource revenues more e¢ ciently than a democratic regime, in which social groups enjoy
more freedom to undertake uncoordinated distortive rent seeking activities. In this section,
we propose an extension to our framework that takes into account these features and show
it can lead natural resources to a¤ect negatively the consolidation of democratic regimes. In-
terestingly, this comparative statics illustrates the possibility of a political curse e¤ect of
natural resources on political institutions going through the channel of political socialization
and cultural evolution.
To see that, consider the existence of K  2 groups of equal size in the society, so that
each group has size (1  x)=K. Under a democratic regime, each group k = 1; :::;K may exert
an e¤ort wk to appropriate natural resources N .26 We assume the absence of coordination
25A similar results obtains when @=@q < 0. At higher levels of q corresponds a lower  since @=@q < 0 and
this also reduces ~q ().
26This implies that natural resources do not enter into the government budget constraint.
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problems within each group so that each agent i of group k exerts an e¤ort
wik =
wk
(1  x)=K =
K
1  xwk:
The utility cost of e¤ort for each agent is linear in wik. Total e¤ort for rent-seeking activities
in the society will be given by
W =
KX
k=1
wk; (31)
and the share of natural resources appropriated by each group k is equal to its share of e¤ort,
i.e. equal to wk=W . We also assume that total e¤ort in rent-seeking a¤ects negatively the
individualsproductivity, i.e. A(W ) with A0(W )  @A(W )=@W < 0 and A00(W )  0. This
last assumption is consistent with the rent seeking literature that emphasizes the distortive
aspect of rent-seeking behavior on the non-resource economy, such as diverting entrepreneurial
talent to unproductive rent-seeking (Torvik, 2002, and Mehlum et al., 2006), or erosion of
property rights in the non-resource sector (Hodler, 2006). Finally, we assume that the military
gets all natural resources in military dictatorship, which implies that wk = 0 for all k.
We rst compute the optimal e¤ort of each individual in rent-seeking activities. Since this
is chosen at the group level and all individuals in the group exert the same e¤ort, we can write
the maximization problem of an (uncommitted) individual belonging to group k in the second
period of life under democracy as follows
max
wk
a(W ) +
K
1  x

 wk + wk
W
N

(32)
with a(W )  (1  ^)A(W ) + ^(1  x)A(W )  xh=;
where W is given by (31) and a(W ) denotes the per-period utility of the citizen net of the
natural resources rents and of the rent-seeking e¤ort.
The rst order condition of problem (32) is
[(1  ^) + ^(1  x)]A0(W ) + K
1  x

 1 + W   wk
W 2
N

= 0; (33)
where we have used the fact that @W=@wk = 1.27 Given that all groups have the same
size and there is no heterogeneity among them, the equilibrium is symmetric and, therefore,
wk = W=K for all k = 1; :::;K. Taking into account this fact, equation (33) denes the
27The second order condition of this problem can be written as
[(1  ^) + ^(1  x)]A00(W )  K
1  x2N
W   wk
W 3
< 0;
and it is always satised since A00(W ) is nonpositive.
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equilibrium level of total e¤ort W  and consequently the equilibrium e¤ort in rent-seeking by
each group k equal to wk = W
=N . It can easily be observed that the total e¤ort in rent-
seeking activities is increasing in the amount N of natural resources available, and that this
reduces the productivity of the individuals (i.e., @A(W )=@N < 0).
In order to determine the e¤ect of natural resources on the consolidation of democracy, we
need understand the e¤ect of an increase in N on ~q() and on bu (qt) and bc (qt) (which in
turn a¤ect ~qu and ~qc respectively). As in Section 6, the decision problem of the military about
undertaking coups is unchanged, which means that an increase in N reduces the probability
of consolidation of democracy by increasing ~q().
For the optimal levels of public democratic investment bu (q) and bc (q) ; it can be shown
that the impact of N depends crucially on the number K of rent-seeking groups in society.
Indeed when there are few groups doing rent-seeking under democracy, each group limits its
rent-seeking behavior about natural resources as it partly internalizes the negative externalities
generated by such activities on the non-resource sector. The individualsutility then increases
in the amount N of natural resources available and this increases the incentive of a democratic
government to spend more resources in public democratic investment in order to defend the
regime (i.e., @bc (qt) =@N > 0 and @bu (qt) =@N > 0). When instead the number of rent-
seeking groups is very large, such as in the limit case where K tends to innity, one gets the
situation of competitive rent-seeking where each group is very small and does not internalize
the distortive e¤ects generated by its behavior on the rest of the economy. This translates into
a strong decrease in market productivity A and a reduction of public democratic investment as
citizens gain less from the defense of democracy. In turn, the reduction of the optimal levels of
public democratic investment bu (q) and bc (q) imply lower thresholds ~qu and ~qc of the steady
state composition of society, which means a lower probability of a transition to a consolidated
democracy.
Specically when K is su¢ ciently high, then a higher level of natural resources has an
unambiguously negative e¤ect on the consolidation of democracy and one gets the following
proposition.
Proposition 11 A higher level of natural resources N increases the threshold ~q (). When
the number of groups in the society is su¢ ciently large, (i.e., K > K) a higher N reduces
both bu (q) and bc (q) and makes democratic consolidation unambiguously less likely. When the
number of groups in the society is not too large, (i.e., K < K) more natural resources have
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instead an ambiguous e¤ect on democratic consolidation.28
Proof. See the Appendix.
 Permanent of e¤ects of temporary shocks on the consolidation of democracy
The framework presented has also the feature that temporary shocks may have permanent
e¤ects on the consolidation of democracy through the process of family transmission of politi-
cal culture. Consider for example a temporary increase in the level of productivity at time t,
so that At > 0. As shown in Section 6, a permanent increase in A has ambiguous e¤ects on
the probability of consolidation of democracy as it increases the public democratic investment
bu (qt) and bc (qt) (and the associated steady state values of the share of committed and un-
committed citizens in the society, ~qc and ~qu) but it also lowers the threshold ~q () above which
the military does not attempt coups. In the case of one period increase in A, the long run value
of ~q () is unchanged. However, the increase in the public democratic investment generated
by a higher productivity also rises the probability that the democratic regime persists from
t to t + 1, which gives more incentives to the committed individuals to transmit their traits
(i.e., @qt+1=@At > 0). As the level of committed citizens at time t + 1 is higher (relative to
the case where there is no productivity shock), the probability to remain in democracy will
also be higher. This positively a¤ects the transmission of political culture and the probability
to remain in democracy at t + 1. The mechanism just described is at work in all periods. In
sum, while the impact of an increase in A will decline over time, its nal e¤ect is a higher
probability that democracy persists and consolidates.
8 Some evidence
In this section, we provide a few but signicant illustrations of some of the main mechanisms on
which our theory is based. We rst focus on the cases of Post World War II Federal Republic
of Germany and Japan. Then we consider the interesting case of Estonia during much of its
20th century turbulent history.
8.1 The cases of post World War II: Germany and Japan
Germany:
28Under the additional convenient assumption that A000(W )  0, it can be shown that the threshold K above
which such negative e¤ect is unambiguous is unique.
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As it is well-known, political (and economic) institutions in both the Federal Republic of
Germany and in the former Empire of Japan were drastically transformed under the active
supervision of the Allied military government. This process of essentially exogenous institu-
tional change, following the military defeat of the Axis power in 1945, lead to creation in both
countries of parliamentary democracies, whose legislature was elected under universal su¤rage.
Nevertheless, a major concern was raised in both countries relative to the congruence between
the new democratic institutions and the prevailing political culture within the West German
and Japanese population.
In the case of Germany, [...] this concern was reinforced by early postwar surveys, which
suggested that Germans had neither developed a deep commitment to the democratic forms of
the Federal Republic nor adopted appropriate roles as citizens participating in a democracy.
(Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981, p. 16). Nevertheless, since the end of World War II
both the Allied occupation forces and then the Federal government undertook a major e¤ort to
reeducate or denazifythe German people (related in our model to the variable of investment
in public socialization b). This program not only included the removal of former Nazi from
most power positions and the punishment of war criminals, but also use the mass media, the
educational system and public forum to conduct a pervasive campaign of political education
of democratic norms, targeted particularly to the younger generations.29
By several quantitative indicators, this major public investment in political education ap-
peared to be highly fruitful according to di¤erent pieces of evidence cited in (Baker, Dalton,
and Hildebrandt, 1981). For instance, the number of citizens of the Federal Republic who
believed that Bundestag represented the public interest doubled between 1951 and 1964; while
only over half favored a democratic form of government, the same gure increased to three
quarters by 1965 (see p. 25). Moreover, political discussion was much higher in 1973 then it
used to be in 1953, with the youngest generation raised in the democratic environment of the
Federal Republic showing the highest level of it (see p. 39, and p. 48). In 1973, 44% of the
German citizens (see p. 30) felt that they could bring about a change in their nation, a gure
somewhat above the corresponding mean at the European level of 41%, which demonstrate a
relatively di¤used sense of political e¢ cacy, and therefore of internalization of a fundamental
democratic norm.
These features lead Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt to conclude that: All the evidence
suggests that a viable democratic political culture has developed in the Federal Republic of
Germany during the postwar period. Because di¤use support for the system and its norms is
29See also Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981, ch. 1).
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quite pervasive [i.e. the number of committed citizens is relatively high in terms of our model],
it is increasingly inappropriate to argue that the German political culture is incongruent with
the existing political structure.(Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981, p. 69).
Japan:
Similarly for Japan, 1945 war defeat represented a major catalyst for radical political and
social change. As World War II came denitively to an end, there was the creation of new
democratic institutions at the behest of external authorities (Sayuri, 2010). In the postwar
years of the Allied occupation (194551) the country was run by the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP) whose occupation policies contributed to transform profoundly the
key institutions of the post-war Japan, with the focus on the twofold aim of demilitarization
and democratization. These objectives were codied in the new Japanese Constitution of 1947,
considered one of the most advanced democratic constitution of its time. In particular, the
explicit renunciation of war and the extent of guaranteed human rights represented the two
major innovations of the Japans post-war constitution.
As in the case of the denazication in Germany, the process of demilitarization in Japan
targeted those o¢ cials, journalists, educators and businessman blamed for being implicated
in the pre-war militarist policies. Alongside the dismantling of Japanese militarist structure,
a wide program of reforms whose implementation relied heavily on Japanese local authorities
was started to democratize Japans political and social institutions.
One of the main target of reform was the educational system, being one of the primary
agent of socialization blamed for spreading pre-war militarist ideas throughout the Japanese
population. A series of initiatives were implemented in the eld of education to pursue, coher-
ently with the broader reform action of the postwar years, the general goals of demilitarization,
democratization and delocalization: about one quarter of the teachers in charge during the pre-
war time left the profession; teaching programmes and textbooks were revised; the old elitist
structure was dismantled and a new educational system was shaped upon the US model; the
control of education of young people was democratized by transferring a large number of re-
sponsibilities to local education authorities, namely locally elected boards acting independently
from the Ministry of Education (Neary, 2002, pp. 4041).
The new educational system played a crucial role in spreading a democratic political culture
among the youngest generations of Japanese. The early 1960s witnessed the rst open and
massive expression of this new political consciousness, as thousands of young Japanese took
the street to protest against the renewal of Japans unequal security treaty with the United
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States (Haddad, 2012, p. 66). As Haddad highlights, the target of the mass protests was not
the treaty itself, but the method used to pass it, which infringed the normal democratic proce-
dure. Hence, protagonists of this early episode of protest were young students who belonged to
the rst generation to have been educated in the postwar democratic educational system; fed
with democratic ideas and become politically active, they were asserting their role as active
citizens (Haddad, 2012, p. 66). As the new generations educated after WWII were increas-
ingly numerous in the Japanese society, their democratic political culture began to take roots
and to become increasingly dominant. According to Haddads tipping point model of politi-
cal change grounded on the importance of generational e¤ects in creating opportunities for
democratic change a further consolidation and deepening of Japans democratic institutions
occurred when the post-war generation took over important positions of power in the mid-
1990s and reformed democratic institutions to better serve the needs of Japans contemporary
society (Haddad, 2012, pp. 98101).
Alongside the central role played by education and generational fractures, a further element
contributed to shape Japans democratic political culture, i.e. the persistence of some aspects
of the countrys traditional political culture. In his analysis of Japanese political culture,
Richardson (1974, p. 244) has come to the conclusion that, looking at the short experience
of the Japanese postwar democracy, it could be argued that democratic concepts can be
internalized at the mass level in a relatively short period of timewith Japan developing its
own peculiar viable democratic political culture. Indeed, the adoption of democratic values,
institutions and practises has been accompanied by the preservation of important aspects of
their traditional culture (Haddad, 2012, p. 101). Given that part of these traditional traits
were going through family transmission, these facts are consistent with our view of a certain
congruence between family political socialization and public indoctrination.
The case of Japan is also a good example of the persistency of political culture across
time. An example is provided by the fact that the Japanese democracy features very high
level of civic engagement compared to other Western democracies. As a legacy of the wartime
mobilization and of pre-war civic activities, civic engagement registered a rapid increase in
postwar time. As argued by Kage, civic engagement acted as an important accelerator for the
rebuilding of Japan in the aftermath of WWII (Kage, 2011, p. 159); and it still represents a
cornerstone of todays Japanese democracy. An example of Japans extraordinary high rates
of civic participation is provided by the fact that more than 90% of Japanese families are
members of their local neighborhood associations (Haddad, 2012, p. 194).
To conclude, from 1945 onwards Japanese succeeded in adopting liberal democratic insti-
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tutions introduced from outside during the occupation time; and by reshaping them through
the development of a Japanese democratic political culture, they have created their own con-
solidated democratic structures.
8.2 The case of Estonia in 19181991
The case of Estonia during the period 1918-1991 provides another illustration of our theory
and the causal mechanisms interlinking political institutions, political socialization and cultural
legacies. In particular, the Estonian case highlights the following features of our theory: a)
an incumbent (unconsolidated) democratic government has the incentive to invest in civic
virtues (democratic infrastructure or public political socialization); b) citizens committed to
democracy tend to invest in transmitting their type to their o¤spring (private political
socialization), and the more so under democracy; nally c) democratic virtues (i.e., the mass
of citizens committed to democracy) has some degree of persistence (declining over time) in
presence of nondemocratic formal political institutions, while the future of a new democracy
depends on historical legacies (the number of citizens intrinsically committed to democracy
present at the critical juncture of the democratic transition).30
This section draws extensively on the recent contributions of Bennich-Björkman (2007a,
2007b and 2007c), which address the question of how institutional change a¤ects political
culture, but also the complementary question of how the persistence of a certain type of
culture potentially inuences the consolidation of new political institutions. The author draws
on previous historical and sociological research. It also presents an original body of evidence
consisting in interviews, conducted in 1998, with the surviving members the generation of
Estonians whose original socialization occurred during in the 1920s and 1930s (the rst episode
of democratic government in Estonian history). This cohort of people is of particular interest
since in 1944 a fraction of it left the country, mainly to resettled in democratic countries such as
Sweden and Canada (relatively similar in terms of political culture and especially political and
economic institutions),31 and the rest stayed and lived under the Soviet rule in the Estonian
Soviet Socialist Republic for the following four decades.32
30More generally, as already remarked, several other success stories of Post-Communist democratization
like the ones of Poland and Slovenia, as well as other examples much more troubled democratization paths
of countries like Russia, Ukraine, Romania, or Bulgaria, point out to the importance of particular historical
legacies (e.g., civic virtues) that these societies carried with them into democratic times. See for instance,
Dryzek and Holmes (2002), Grzymala-Busse (2002), Jones-Luong (2002) and Kitschelt (2003).
31See also Bennich-Björkman (2006) for a comparative analysis mainly focused on the di¤erences in political
culture between Swedish-Estonians and the Canadian-Estonians.
32The opinion survey in question was conducted in 1998 and involved 291 Estonians living at that time
respectively in their native country, in Sweden and in Canada. These two groups of people thus potentially
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A brief review of the most signicant events in the history of Estonia since its independence
from the Russian Empire in 1918, to its secession from the Soviet Union in 1991, will be
helpful. Estonia became an independent nation, whose state had the form of a parliamentary
Republic with proportional representation (modelled after the constitution of the Weimar
Republic), in 1918 after the defeat of the Russian Empire in World War I. Equally interesting,
the overwhelming de facto political power enjoyed by the Junkers landlords aristocracy until
then was broken-up by a major agrarian reform immediately implemented by the newly born
state. This lead to a society with a relatively horizontal structure mainly formed by small-
scale peasants with a petit urban bourgeoisie. The economic power of the new state was
also consolidated, as part of the Junkers holding were converted into state property. The
creation of the Estonian Republic came along with a major transformation and reallocation
of both de jure and de facto political power, both in the direction of consolidating the newly
established democratic regime. Furthermore, the land reform itself favoured the creation of a
multitude of cooperative producersassociations, supported by the state which contributed to
the consolidation of the civil society (we will discuss this issue further below).
A signicant fact documented by various historians is the major e¤ort done since the very
beginning by the new Estonian democratic government, both at the central and local level, to
increase both the level of formal education, and the di¤usion of democratic values (through the
schooling process and other channels), especially among the young generations socialized during
the 1920s and 1930s. For example, Estonian language schools were established, and artistic
life of all kinds ourished. In 1919, instruction in the Estonian language was introduced at the
University of Tartu; in addition, Tallinn Technical University and the Estonian Academy of
Music were established in Tallinn. One of the more notable cultural acts of the independence
period, unique in Western Europe at the time of its passage in 1925, was a guarantee of
cultural autonomy to minority groups comprising at least 3,000 persons, including Jews. The
democratic character of the Estonian educational and cultural reforms, and more generally
the generous and tolerant legislation toward minorities implemented (Church and state were
formally separated in Estonia in 1925; see Hope, 1994, p. 46), is important since it clearly
highlights of existence and progressive consolidation of shared republican values since the early
represent, loosely speaking, respectively the treatment and the control group of a potential quasi-natural
experiment consisting in the invasion of Estonia by the Red Army in 1944. Nevertheless, as Bennich-Björkman
remarks, the decision to migrate was a¤ected by social and geographic factors, and therefore the assignment of
individuals to the two groups was far from random, due to a potential selection bias. See Appendix A and B
of Bennich-Björkman (2007b) for a detailed description of the construction of the survey and the results of its
statistical analysis.
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years of the new state.33
In addition, many people interviewed (see Bennich-Björkman, 2007c, pp. 3738) recall
that the educational process put special emphasis on civic education and nationalism (public
investment in political socialization), which can be thought of in terms of our model as a
relatively high investment in the endogenous component of b. In particular, civic training
focused on the rights of citizens and on the workings of the democratic process. These facts
match with the prediction of our theory that a relatively unconsolidated democracy has the
incentive to invest in increasing the democratic stock of its citizens, a goal that can be partly
achieved by empowering the public educational system as agency not only of transmission of
human capital, but also of promotion of democratic political socialization.
Between the 1920s and the 1940s the Estonian society a whole became indeed, [...] highly
communal. Civil society was vibrant, and voluntary associations covering various aspects of
life and diverse elds of interest lled the country...(Bennich-Björkman, 2007c, p. 26; see also
on this issue Uustalu, 1952, pp. 23334; Hope, 1994, p. 56; Ruutsoo, 2002, p. 57). Estonian
culture was a culture of joiners,and in this respect the Latvian and Estonian societies were
in agreement while Lithuania had much weaker traditions of associational life (Ruutsoo, 2002,
p. 59).34
It is thus not too surprising (and consistent with our model) that in 1924 the Estonian
government was able to defeat a coup attempt orchestrated by the Estonian Communist party
and supported by Moscow. Both the relatively egalitarian distribution of income caused by the
original land reform, and the peculiarly high degree of development of civicness, a democratic
spirit within the society (which is of course the novel variable emphasized by our theory relative
to the standard models of political transitions), generated a di¤used support for the incumbent
democracy. Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1934, Konstantin Pats, chief of the government
together with Johan Laidoner, head of the army, violated the constitution by establishing a
right-wing, authoritarian, presidential government. This event was one example of the many
democratic breakdowns occurred in Europe, and in particular in all of the three Baltic republics,
following the economic and political crisis of the early 1930s. In terms of our model, it can
be explained with a relatively low draw of the random variable " (the exogenous component
33Arguably, this rich civic life was itself partly rooted in the previous Estonian historical experience transmit-
ted across generations. The will to associate with one other must also have rested on a sense of trust in society,
which may have emanated from the shared su¤ering, the historic experiences, and the similar living conditions
that many found themselves in. Joining together in organizations became also an expression of citizenship:
Estonia was a young state that needed you.(Bennich-Björkman, 2007c, p. 28).
34 Interestingly, according to Hope (1994, p. 45), a cooperative movement providing credit and other services
emerged in Estonia as early as the 1870s, and it quickly resumed operation in the 1920s, after the interruption
occurred during the war period.
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in the democratic stock) and the stochastic nature of political transition processes. Yet, the
authoritarian government established in Estonia was signicantly weaker than its counterparts
in both Latvia and Lithuania, a fact which arguably reected the relatively stronger degree of
consolidation of democratic virtues present in the Estonian society. Estonia then developed
a civic culture that partly survived even during the Päts regime. Indeed, as explained in
greater detail below, These experiences surfaced once the yolk of Stalinism was lifted in the
1950s and shaped Estonia under Communism into a society of collective mobilizationwhere
democratically inclined counter-elites could form.(Bennich-Björkman, 2007b, p. 316).
Estonia ceased to be an independent state again in 1940, following its invasion by the
Soviet Union.35 It was then temporarily occupied by the German army in 1941 after Germany
declared war to and invaded the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), and then recaptured
by the Red Army in 1944. It was thereafter part of the Soviet Union until the breakdown of
the latter in 1991, when it once again obtained independence.
As already mentioned, in 1944 the democratic generation(born between 1915 and 1925),
either stayed in their homeland or left (mainly) for Sweden or Canada. The main empirical
results on the survey comparing the values of the sample of this set of Estonians interviewed
by Bennich-Björkman are the following.
First of all, cultural adaptation and evolution did take place. As a matter of fact, early
civic-oriented socialization did not safeguard Estonians of the interwar period who lived under
authoritarian rule against becoming less democratic than their counterparts in exile. Simi-
larly, while the exiles actively organized themselves to maintain their civic-minded culture,
existing institutions and external impulses also did break through and a¤ected their mentali-
ties (Bennich-Björkman, 2007c, p. 117). This nding is congruent with the prediction of our
theory that political culture is to some degree persistent across time, and in particular through
the mechanism of its transmission by the family. However, it is also potentially gradually
reshaped by the presence of incongruentpolitical institutions which attempt themselves to
indoctrinate people with di¤erent political values. Consistent with our theory, such policy was
actively pursued by the Soviet government and was indeed to some extent e¤ective in mitigat-
ing over time the direct and indirect inuence of the democratic generationsocialized in the
1920s and 1930s.36
35The occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union was contemplated by the one of the secret protocols of the
infamous Ribbentrop-Molotovpact of August 1939, which precluded the German invasion of Poland and the
outbreak of World War II.
36 In particular, the Sovietization of the Estonian population was mostly e¤ective in eroding generalized
values such as trusts, tolerance and political e¢ cacy (dened as the perception of making a di¤erence in
the political process). However, it had much less e¤ect on civic virtues, which are some of the main cultural
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Second, and related, there is also some evidence that, again consistent with our theory, the
relatively smooth process of consolidation of democratic institution experienced by Estonia in
the early 1990s may have been facilitated by the intergenerational transmission through micro-
entities such as the family, of the stock democratic political culture produced early on in the
20th century under the government of the independent Estonian state. For instance Haerpfer,
Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel (2009, p. 317, Table 20.2) report that Estonia outperformed
all other electoral democracies in Post-Communist Europe in the period 19932006, according
to both the Freedom House and the Polity IV indicators of democratic development. The
conclusions of the author on this issue are summarized in the following sentence. Do the
results indicate that the Estonian transition to democracy is the beginning of the 1990s even
could have been facilitated by a collective memory of political cultural traditions from the rst
republic transmitted not least by this interwar generation? The results just discussed partially
point to an a¢ rmative answer.Moreover, The republican interwar generation thus played
a role in preserving such an Estonian identity, even though it has also signicantly a¤ected
by Soviet experiences (see Bennich-Björkman, 2007c, p. 116). This nding is congruent
with our result that the e¤ort made by the committed family to transmit their own trait,
decreases when a nondemocratic government invests more in various forms of repression in
the rst place (i.e., when  is higher). However it may still remain positive and maintain a
certain degree of transmission over generations. As a consequence, the inuence of the original
political culture tends to decrease (but not necessarily to vanish) across the new generations.
As Bennich-Björkman, (2007b, p. 342) concludes [...] What Estonias twentieth-century
history nevertheless tells us is that a legacy of civic culture can travel in time and constitute
a tremendous asset for a state in the process of transition to democratic government.
9 Conclusions
We regard this paper as a rst attempt to link two bodies of literature that, to best of our
knowledge, were previously disconnected: the literature on endogenous political transitions on
the one hand, and on the endogenous intergenerational transmission of preferences on the other.
The motivation for this exercise is provided by much scholarship in comparative politics, which
argues that political culture is an important determinant of many political outcomes including
the dynamics of political regimes. Furthermore, we have argued that some important facts,
such as the di¤erent paths of political development followed by former Communist countries
reection of democracy, such as activity and participation, and personal autonomy. See Bennich-Björkman
(2007a, pp. 1016).
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cannot be entirely explained by standard rst generationmodels of political transitions where
agents have only induced, as opposed to intrinsic preferences over political institutions.
Rather then summarizing the results of the paper, we prefer to discuss briey a few potential
new directions of research. Many questions remain indeed still open. First and foremost,
is the question of how income inequality (neglected in this paper), and the related class-
conict, interact with the politico-cultural conict (between citizens who are and who are
not committed to democracy), and the civil-military conict (between the civil society as
a whole and the army). Second, it would be potentially interesting to investigate how the
dynamics of political culture is shaped by institutions other than the state or the family,
such as religious organizations. Third, an interesting question to be pursued is how di¤erent
patterns of democracy (i.e., the electoral system or the form of government) inuence the
dynamics of political culture and democratic consolidation. We hope that the bare-bone model
of democracy and culture considered here can be used as a stepping stone in addressing these
important issues in future research.
10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 3
When qt 2 [0; 1=2], the derivation of (8) with respect to bt leads to (12) which implicitly denes
bu (qt). The second order condition of problem (8) reduces to  C 00 (bt) < 0, which is always
satised. The uncommitted will never choose a level of public democratic investment higher
than , as the committed will oppose to a coup with certainty (i.e., P (b2t) = 1) when bt = .
This implies that the optimal provision of public democratic investment for the uncommitted
needs to be rewritten as bu (qt) = min fbu (qt) ; g.
In the region qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()), the committed are in power and the optimal provision
of public democratic investment bc (qt) in (13) is obtained deriving (11). The second order
condition of problem (11) is
1=b < C 00 (bt) ; (34)
which requires that the cost function of bt is su¢ ciently convex or the variance of the shock to
the democratic capital stock su¢ ciently high (i.e., b high enough).
When qt 2 [~q () ; 1] the utility of the committed and uncommitted are equal and dened
by (8) with F (qt) = 1. The rst order condition is
 C 0 (bt) +
 
1=b

[a  (1  ^)A] = 0;
45
which shows that b is independent on qt. When b  , there is always the possibility that
bt;2 <  and that a transition to dictatorship occurs. Assumption 4 ensures that the optimal
public democratic investment for both committed and uncommitted is b =  when qt  ~q().
10.2 Proof of Proposition 7
If ~q () > 1=2 and qt 2 [1=2; ~q ()], the committed citizens are the majority and decide the
democratic scal policy. The steady state share of committed citizens ~qc will be given by (25),
with be (qe) = bc (qt) determined by (13), i.e.,
bc (~qc) + b  
2
=
~qc
1  ~qc :
In general, equation (26) does not lead to a unique equilibrium. However, as the right
hand side of (26) is increasing and convex in q, a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is that
the function bc (q) is increasing and weakly concave in q. From the di¤erentiation of (13) with
respect to q, we obtain
 C 00 (bc) @bc
@q
+
1
b
F 0 (q) [a  (1  ^)A] + 1b
@bc
@q
= 0 (35)
and
@bc
@q
=
 
1=b

F 0 (q) [a  (1  ^)A]
C 00 (bc)  1=b
> 0;
since the denominator is positive from (34). The di¤erentiation of (35) with respect to q leads
to
@2bc
@q2
=
F 00 (q) [a  (1  ^)A] C 00 (bc)  b  C 000 (bc)F 0 (q) [a  (1  ^)A] 
1=b
  
C 00 (bc)  b
2 : (36)
The weak concavity of bc (q) requires that the numerator of (36) is nonpositive, i.e., that
F 00 (q)  C
000 (bc)F 0 (q)
C 00 (bc)  b
: (37)
We assume that F 00 (q) is not too high, which implies that F 0 (q) = f(q) is not too increasing,
and that
C 00 (bc) > max

b;
 
1=b
	
;
so that condition (37) is satised.
Under these conditions, the steady state value of the share of committed citizens ~qc in the
society is unique and implicitly dened by (26). When qt < ~qc, qt+1 > 0 and the share of
committed citizens increases over time, while the opposite happens when qt < ~qc.
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When qt 2 [0;max f1=2; ~q ()g), the uncommitted citizens are the majority and decide scal
policy. This implies that the steady state value of the share of committed citizens in the society
~qu is given by (25), where be (qe) = bu (qt) is determined by (12), i.e.,
bu (~qu) + b  
2
=
~qu
1  ~qu :
Again, when qt < ~qu, qt+1 > 0 and qt increases over time, and vice versa.
From the fact that bc (qt) > bu (qt) (see Proposition 3) follows that ~qc > ~qu.
When qt < ~q () and the military are in power, there is always the possibility that a
rebellion takes place (from Assumption 4) and that the political system becomes democratic.
We now obtain that for the committed parents
V ct+1 (M)  V cct+1 (M)  V cut+1 (M)
= Et

"t  
 
 +M
 j"t     +M  0	 = b    +M2
2b
;
and for the uncommitted parents
V ut+1 (M)  V uut+1 (M)  V uct+1 (M) =
 
 +M
 b    +M
b
;
where M  M (qt) is dened by (16). The substitution of the last two expressions into
(22) implies that the steady state composition ~qM of society in military dictatorship is implicitly
dened by the following equation
b   (~qM )
2 (~qM )
=
~qM
1  ~qM ;
where  (~qM )   + M (~qM ). Again, qt+1 > 0 and qt increases over time when qt < ~qM ,
and vice versa.
The ranking ~qc > ~qu > ~qM follows immediately from (26), (27), (28) and Proposition (4).
10.3 Proof of Proposition 9
If ~q ()  1=2 and ~qu  ~q (), then qt+1 > qt for all qt 2 [0; ~q ()) and the probability
that democracy persists when qt 2 [0; ~q ()) is P (bu (qt))F (qt), which is increasing in qt and
therefore in t (see Proposition 8). Similarly, if ~q () > 1=2 and ~qc  ~q (), then the probability
that democracy persists is P (bc (qt))F (qt) for all qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()), and qt+1 > qt for all
qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()). Finally, if ~qc  ~q () > 1=2 and ~qu  1=2, democracy persists with probability
P (bc (qt))F (qt) for all qt 2 (1=2; ~q ()), and with probability P (bu (qt))F (qt) for all qt 2
[0; 1=2], with qt+1 > qt for all qt 2 [0; ~q ()).
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10.4 Proof of Proposition 10
From (30), it is straightforward that ~q () is increasing in ^ , A, and N , and it is decreasing in
h and , while it is independent on H.
Di¤erentiating (13) with respect to ^ and rearranging terms, we obtain that
@bc (qt)
@^
=
A (1  x)F (qt)
b

C 00 (bc (qt)) 
 
1=b
 > 0:
From (13) we also have that
@bc (qt)
@A
=
^ (1  x)F (qt)
b

C 00 (bc (qt)) 
 
1=b
 > 0;
@bc (qt)
@N
=
F (qt)
b

C 00 (bc (qt)) 
 
1=b
 > 0;
@bc (qt)
@h
=
@bc (qt)
@H
=   xF (qt)
b

C 00 (bc (qt)) 
 
1=b
 < 0;
and
@bc (qt)
@
= 0:
Similarly, we obtain that @bu (qt) =@^ > 0, @bu (qt) =@A > 0, @bu (qt) =@N > 0, @bu (qt) =@h =
@bu (qt) =@H < 0, and @bu (qt) =@ = 0.
10.5 Proof of proposition 11
We rst derive some preliminary results that have been reported in the text before the state-
ment of the proposition.
Equation (33) dening the optimal level of total e¤ort W  can be rewritten as
N
W
=
K
K   1

1  1  x
K
[(1  ^) + ^(1  x)]A0(W )

; (38)
once we take into account that the equilibrium is symmetric (wk =W=K for all k = 1; :::;K).
As the left hand side of (38) is a strictly decreasing function in W and the right hand side
is increasing in W , W  is unique and the optimal e¤ort in rent-seeking by each group k is
wk =W
=N .
Total e¤ort in rent-seeking activities is increasing in the amount N of natural resources
available, and that this reduces the productivity of the individuals. Indeed denoting with
IF the left hand side of (33) dening W  and applying the implicit function theorem to this
equation, we have that
@W 
@N
=   @IF=@N
@IF=@W
> 0;
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as @IF=@W < 0 from the second order condition and @IF=@N = K (W   wk) = (1  x)W 2 >
0. Hence, @A(W )=@N < 0 follows from A0(W ) < 0.
As in Section 6, the decision problem of the military about undertaking coups is unchanged,
which means that an increase in N reduces the probability of consolidation of democracy by
increasing ~q().
The e¤ect of N on the optimal levels of public democratic investment bu (q) and bc (q) may
now be di¤erent than in the baseline framework. It can be easily shown that bu (q) and bc (q)
are still given by (12) and (13) with the term a replaced by a(W ) as dened in (32) and with
the additional terms on gains and e¤ort costs from natural resources. In particular, bc (q) is
now dened by
 C 0 (bt) +
 
1=b

F (qt)

a(W )  (1  ^)A+ K
1  x

 wk + wk
W
N

+
b+ bt   
b
= 0: (39)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (39) leads to
@bc (qt)
@N
=
F (qt)
b

C 00 (bc (qt)) 
 
1=b
 (40)
[(1  ^) + ^(1  x)]

A0(W )
K   2
K   1  
W
K   1A
00(W )

+
1
(1  x)(K   1)

@W
@N
;
where we have used the fact that N=W is dened by (38), and @wk=@W = 1=K since wk =
W=K. As @W=@N > 0 and the denominator of the rst term of (40) is positive, the sign of
@bc (qt) =@N is determined by the expression in brace. The component containing A0(W ) is
negative while the other two are positive; this implies that the e¤ect of a higher level of natural
resources on the public democratic investment is generally ambiguous.
However, one can notice that when there are two groups in the society (K = 2), the rst
term is zero and therefore @bc (qt) =@N > 0. When instead the number of rent-seeking groups
is very large, such as in the limit case where K tends to innity, the two positive terms of
(40) are small enough and @bc (qt) =@N < 0. Hence there exists a threshold K such that
@bc (qt) =@N < 0 holds for K > K.
Under the additional assumption that A000(W )  0, it can be shown that the threshold K
above which such negative e¤ect is unambiguous in unique. Indeed the term in brace in (40)
is monotonically decreasing in K if
[(1  ^) + ^(1  x)]

A0(W )
(K   1)2 +

W
(K   1)2 +
K   2
K   1
@W
@K

A00(W )  W
(K   1)A
000(W )
@W
@K

  1
(1  x)2(K   1)2 < 0 ;
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which is always satised when A000(W )  0, since @W=@K > 0 from (38).
The term in brace in (40) is monotonically decreasing in K and the fact that this is
positive for K = 2 and negative for K su¢ ciently high implies there exists a unique K such
that @bc (qt) =@N < 0 for K > K and vice versa. Similar results obviously hold as well for
bu (q).
The reduction of the optimal levels of public democratic investment bu (q) and bc (q) imply
lower thresholds ~qu and ~qc of the steady state composition of society, which means a lower
probability of a transition to a consolidated democracy.
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